SETCRED(2) FreeBSD System Calls Manual SETCRED(2)
NAME
setcred - set current process credentials atomically
LIBRARY
Standard C Library (libc, -lc)
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/ucred.h>
int
setcred(u_int flags, const struct setcred *wcred, size_t size);
DESCRIPTION
The setcred() system call can set any combination of user-accessible
credentials of the current process in an atomic manner.
This system call is normally permitted only for processes having the ID
of the super-user (0) as their effective user ID, or not at all if the
sysctl(8) variable security.bsd.suser_enabled is zero or some active MAC
policy specifically denies these processes.
Some MAC policies, such as mac_do(4), may also allow unprivileged users
to call it successfully, possibly depending on the exact credentials
transition requested, once again unless any active MAC policy
specifically denies that.
The flags argument serves to indicate which process credentials should be
changed by the call. Allowed flags are:
SETCREDF_UID Set the effective user ID.
SETCREDF_RUID Set the real user ID.
SETCREDF_SVUID Set the saved user ID.
SETCREDF_GID Set the effective group ID.
SETCREDF_RGID Set the real group ID.
SETCREDF_SVGID Set the saved group ID.
SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS Set the supplementary group list.
SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL Set the MAC label.
The struct setcred structure is currently defined as:
struct setcred {
uid_t sc_uid; /* effective user id */
uid_t sc_ruid; /* real user id */
uid_t sc_svuid; /* saved user id */
gid_t sc_gid; /* effective group id */
gid_t sc_rgid; /* real group id */
gid_t sc_svgid; /* saved group id */
u_int sc_pad; /* padding, unused */
u_int sc_supp_groups_nb; /* supplementary groups number */
gid_t *sc_supp_groups; /* supplementary groups */
struct mac *sc_label; /* MAC label */
};
Its fields are:
sc_uid The ID to set the effective user to, if flag
SETCREDF_UID is specified.
sc_ruid The ID to set the real user to, if flag
SETCREDF_RUID is specified.
sc_svuid The ID to set the saved user to, if flag
SETCREDF_SVUID is specified.
sc_gid The ID to set the effective group to, if flag
SETCREDF_GID is specified.
sc_rgid The ID to set the real group to, if flag
SETCREDF_RGID is specified.
sc_svgid The ID to set the saved group to, if flag
SETCREDF_SVGID is specified.
sc_supp_groups_nb The size of array sc_supp_groups, if flag
SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS is specified. It must be less
than or equal to {NGROUPS_MAX}.
sc_supp_groups An array of IDs to set the supplementary groups to,
if flag SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS is specified. Note
that all groups in this array will be set as
supplementary groups only, in contrast to
setgroups(2) which treats the first element
specially as the new effective group, not adding it
to supplementary groups.
sc_label A pointer to a valid MAC label structure, e.g.,
built with the mac_from_text(3) function, if flag
SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL is specified.
For forward compatibility and security reasons, it is recommended that
users always initialize objects of type struct setcred with the provided
initializer: SETCRED_INITIALIZER.
The size argument must be the size of the passed wcred structure.
RETURN VALUES
Upon successful completion, the value 0 is returned; otherwise the
value -1 is returned and the global variable errno is set to indicate the
error.
ERRORS
The setcred() system call will fail if:
[EINVAL] Unrecognized flags were passed in flags, or the size
parameter does not match the size of struct setcred,
or the field sc_supp_group_nb has a value strictly
greater than {NGROUPS_MAX} (if flag
SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS was supplied), or the MAC label
pointed to by field sc_label is invalid (if flag
SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL was supplied).
[EFAULT] The wcred pointer, or pointers in fields
sc_supp_groups (if flag SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS was
supplied) or sc_label (if flag SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL was
supplied) point to invalid locations.
[EPERM] The user is not the super-user and/or the requested
credentials transition is not allowed by the system or
MAC modules.
[EOPNOTSUPP] Some of the requested credentials have a type that the
system does not support. This currently can occur
only if the kernel has been compiled without MAC and
SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL has been passed.
SEE ALSO
issetugid(2), setregid(2), setreuid(2), setuid(2), mac_text(3), mac(4),
mac_do(4), maclabel(7)
STANDARDS
The setcred() system call is specific to FreeBSD.
A call to setcred() usually changes process credentials that are listed
by POSIX/SUS standards. The changed values then produce the effects with
respect to the rest of the system that are described in these standards,
as if these changes had resulted from calling standard or traditional
credentials-setting functions. Currently, all flags but
SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL lead to modifying standard credentials.
The only differences in using setcred() to change standard credentials
instead of standard or traditional functions are:
o All requested changes are performed atomically.
o Only the super-user or an unprivileged user authorized by some MAC
module can successfully call setcred(), even if the standard system
calls would have authorized any unprivileged user to effect the same
changes. For example, seteuid() allows any unprivileged user to
change the effective user ID to either the real or saved ones, while
setcred() called with flag SETCREDF_UID does not.
HISTORY
The setcred() system call appeared in FreeBSD 14.3.
Traditionally in UNIX, all credential changes beyond shuffles of
effective, real and saved IDs have been done by setuid binaries that
successively call multiple credentials-setting system calls and in a
specific order. For example, to change all user IDs to that of some
unprivileged user, setuid() must be called last so that all other
credentials-changing calls can be performed successfully beforehand, as
they require super-user privileges.
This piecewise approach causes such a process to transiently hold high
privilege credentials that are neither the original nor necessarily the
desired final ones. Besides opening a transition window where possible
vulnerabilities could have catastrophic consequences, it makes it
impossible for the kernel to enforce that only certain transitions of
credentials are allowed.
The necessity of an atomic, global approach to changing credentials
clearly appeared while working on extending mac_do(4) to allow rules to
authorize only specific changes of primary or supplementary groups, which
prompted the addition of setcred().
AUTHORS
The setcred() system call and this manual page were written by Olivier
Certner <
[email protected]>.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The same considerations as those of standard or traditional credentials-
setting system calls apply to setcred(), except for the lack of atomicity
of successive such calls.
In particular, please consult section SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS of the
setuid(2) manual page about the absence of effect of changing standard
credentials on already open files.
FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8 December 19, 2024 FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8