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Command: procctl | Section: 2 | Source: FreeBSD | File: procctl.2.gz
PROCCTL(2) FreeBSD System Calls Manual PROCCTL(2)
NAME
procctl - control processes
LIBRARY
Standard C Library (libc, -lc)
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/procctl.h>
int
procctl(idtype_t idtype, id_t id, int cmd, void *data);
DESCRIPTION
The procctl() system call provides for control over processes. The
idtype and id arguments specify the set of processes to control. If
multiple processes match the identifier, procctl will make a "best
effort" to control as many of the selected processes as possible. An
error is only returned if no selected processes successfully complete the
request. The following identifier types are supported:
P_PID Control the process with the process ID id. id zero is a
shortcut for the calling process ID.
P_PGID Control processes belonging to the process group with the ID id.
The control request to perform is specified by the cmd argument.
All status changing requests (*_CTL) require the caller to have the right
to debug the target. All status query requests (*_STATUS) require the
caller to have the right to observe the target.
The following commands are supported:
PROC_ASLR_CTL Controls Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
in program images created by execve(2) in the
specified process or its descendants that do not
either change the control or modify it by other
means. The data parameter must point to an integer
variable holding one of the following values:
PROC_ASLR_FORCE_ENABLE
Request that ASLR is enabled after
execution, even if it is disabled system-
wide.
PROC_ASLR_FORCE_DISABLE
Request that ASLR is disabled after
execution, even if it is enabled system-
wide.
PROC_ASLR_NOFORCE
Use the system-wide configured policy for
ASLR.
Note that the elfctl(1) "noaslr" flag takes
precedence over this control. Executing a binary
with this flag set will never use ASLR. Similarly,
executing a set-user-ID or set-group-ID binary
ignores this control and only honors the elfctl(1)
flag and system-wide policy.
PROC_ASLR_STATUS Returns the current status of ASLR enablement for
the target process. The data parameter must point
to an integer variable, where one of the following
values is written:
PROC_ASLR_FORCE_ENABLE
PROC_ASLR_FORCE_DISABLE
PROC_ASLR_NOFORCE
If the currently executed image in the process
itself has ASLR enabled, the PROC_ASLR_ACTIVE flag
is or-ed with the value listed above.
PROC_PROTMAX_CTL Controls the maximum protection used for mmap(2)
requests in the target process that do not specify
an explicit maximum protection in the prot argument
via PROT_MAX. The maximum protection limits the
permissions a mapping can be assigned by
mprotect(2). If an explicit maximum protection is
not provided, the maximum protection for a new
mapping is set to either PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC (RWX) or the protection specified in prot.
Mappings created with prot set to PROT_NONE always
use RWX maximum protection.
The data parameter must point to an integer variable
holding one of the following values:
PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_ENABLE
Use the permissions in prot as the implicit
maximum protection, even if RWX permissions
are requested by the sysctl
vm.imply_prot_max.
PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_DISABLE
Use RWX as the implicit maximum protection,
even if constrained permissions are
requested by the sysctl vm.imply_prot_max.
PROC_PROTMAX_NOFORCE
Use the system-wide configured policy for
the implicit PROT_MAX control.
Note that the elfctl(1) "noprotmax" flag takes
precedence over this control. Executing a binary
with this flag set will always use RWX as the
implicit maximum protection.
PROC_PROTMAX_STATUS Returns the current status of the implicit PROT_MAX
control for the target process. The data parameter
must point to an integer variable, where one of the
following values is written:
PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_ENABLE
PROC_PROTMAX_FORCE_DISABLE
PROC_PROTMAX_NOFORCE
If the currently executed image in the process
itself has the implicit PROT_MAX control enabled,
the PROC_PROTMAX_ACTIVE flag is or-ed with the value
listed above.
PROC_SPROTECT Set process protection state. This is used to mark
a process as protected from being killed if the
system exhausts available memory and swap. The data
parameter must point to an integer containing an
operation and zero or more optional flags. The
following operations are supported:
PPROT_SET
Mark the selected processes as protected.
PPROT_CLEAR
Clear the protected state of selected
processes.
The following optional flags are supported:
PPROT_DESCEND
Apply the requested operation to all child
processes of each selected process in
addition to each selected process.
PPROT_INHERIT
When used with PPROT_SET, mark all future
child processes of each selected process as
protected. Future child processes will also
mark all of their future child processes.
PROC_REAP_ACQUIRE Enable orphaned process reaping for future children
of the current process.
If a parent process exits before one or more of its
children processes, the remaining children processes
are orphaned. When an orphaned process exits, it is
reparented to a reaper process that is responsible
for harvesting the terminated process via wait(2).
When this control is enabled, the current process
becomes the reaper process for future children and
their descendants. Existing child processes
continue to use the reaper assigned when the child
was created via fork(2). If a reaper process exits,
all of the processes for whom it was the reaper are
reassigned to the reaper process's reaper.
After system initialization, init(8) is the default
reaper.
PROC_REAP_RELEASE Disable orphaned process reaping for the current
process.
Any processes for whom the current process was the
reaper are reassigned to the current process's
reaper.
PROC_REAP_STATUS Provides a consistent snapshot of information about
the reaper of the specified process, or the process
itself if it is a reaper. The data argument must
point to a procctl_reaper_status structure which is
filled in by the system call on successful return.
struct procctl_reaper_status {
u_int rs_flags;
u_int rs_children;
u_int rs_descendants;
pid_t rs_reaper;
pid_t rs_pid;
};
The rs_flags may have the following flags returned:
REAPER_STATUS_OWNED
The specified process is a reaper. When
this flag is returned, the specified process
id, pid, identifies a reaper, otherwise the
rs_reaper field of the structure is set to
the pid of the reaper for the specified
process id.
REAPER_STATUS_REALINIT
The specified process is the root of the
reaper tree, i.e., init(8).
The rs_children field returns the number of
processes that can be reaped by the reaper that are
also children of the reaper. It is possible to have
a child whose reaper is not the specified process,
since the reaper for existing children is not
changed by PROC_REAP_ACQUIRE. The rs_descendants
field returns the total number of processes that can
be reaped by the reaper. The rs_reaper field
returns the reaper's pid. The rs_pid returns the
pid of one reaper child if there are any processes
that can be reapead; otherwise, it is set to -1.
PROC_REAP_GETPIDS Queries the list of processes that can be reaped by
the reaper of the specified process. The request
takes a pointer to a procctl_reaper_pids structure
in the data parameter.
struct procctl_reaper_pids {
u_int rp_count;
struct procctl_reaper_pidinfo *rp_pids;
};
When called, the rp_pids field must point to an
array of rp_count procctl_reaper_pidinfo structures.
The kernel will populate these structures with
information about the reaper's descendants.
The struct procctl_reaper_pidinfo structure provides
some information about one of the reaper's
descendants. Note that for a descendant that is not
a child, it may be incorrectly identified because of
a race in which the original child process exited
and the exited process's pid was reused for an
unrelated process.
struct procctl_reaper_pidinfo {
pid_t pi_pid;
pid_t pi_subtree;
u_int pi_flags;
};
The pi_pid field is the process id of the
descendant. The pi_subtree field provides the pid
of the direct child of the reaper which is the
(grand-)parent of the descendant process. The
pi_flags field returns the following flags, further
describing the descendant:
REAPER_PIDINFO_VALID
Set to indicate that the
procctl_reaper_pidinfo structure was filled
in by the kernel. Zero-filling the rp_pids
array and testing the REAPER_PIDINFO_VALID
flag allows the caller to detect the end of
the returned array.
REAPER_PIDINFO_CHILD
The pi_pid field identifies a direct child
of the reaper.
REAPER_PIDINFO_REAPER
The reported process is itself a reaper.
The descendants of the subordinate reaper
are not reported.
REAPER_PIDINFO_ZOMBIE
The reported process is in the zombie state,
ready to be reaped.
REAPER_PIDINFO_STOPPED
The reported process is stopped by a
SIGSTOP/SIGTSTP signal.
REAPER_PIDINFO_EXITING
The reported process is in the process of
exiting (but not yet a zombie).
PROC_REAP_KILL Request to deliver a signal to some subset of the
descendants of the reaper. The data parameter must
point to a procctl_reaper_kill structure, which is
used both for parameters and status return.
struct procctl_reaper_kill {
int rk_sig;
u_int rk_flags;
pid_t rk_subtree;
u_int rk_killed;
pid_t rk_fpid;
};
The rk_sig field specifies the signal to be
delivered. Zero is not a valid signal number,
unlike for kill(2). The rk_flags field further
directs the operation. It is or-ed from the
following flags:
REAPER_KILL_CHILDREN
Deliver the specified signal only to direct
children of the reaper.
REAPER_KILL_SUBTREE
Deliver the specified signal only to
descendants that were forked by the direct
child with pid specified in the rk_subtree
field.
If neither the REAPER_KILL_CHILDREN nor the
REAPER_KILL_SUBTREE flags are specified, all current
descendants of the reaper are signalled.
If a signal was delivered to any process, the return
value from the request is zero. In this case, the
rk_killed field identifies the number of processes
signalled. The rk_fpid field is set to the pid of
the first process for which signal delivery failed,
e.g., due to permission problems. If no such
process exists, the rk_fpid field is set to -1.
PROC_TRACE_CTL Enable or disable tracing of the specified
process(es), according to the value of the integer
argument. Tracing includes inspecting the process
via ptrace(2), ktrace(2), debugging sysctls,
hwpmc(4), or dtrace(1) as well as dumping core.
Possible values for the data argument are:
PROC_TRACE_CTL_ENABLE
Enable tracing, after it was disabled by
PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE. Only allowed for
self.
PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE
Disable tracing for the specified process.
Tracing is re-enabled when the process
changes the executing program with the
execve(2) system call. A child inherits the
trace settings from the parent on fork(2).
PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE_EXEC
Same as PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE, but the
setting persists for the process even after
execve(2).
PROC_TRACE_STATUS Returns the current tracing status for the specified
process in the integer variable pointed to by data.
If tracing is disabled, data is set to -1. If
tracing is enabled, but no debugger is attached by
the ptrace(2) system call, data is set to 0. If a
debugger is attached, data is set to the pid of the
debugger process.
PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL Controls the capability mode sandbox actions for the
specified sandboxed processes on a return from any
system call which fails with either an ENOTCAPABLE
or ECAPMODE error. If this control is enabled and a
system call fails with one of these errors, a
synchronous SIGTRAP signal is delivered to the
thread immediately before returning from the system
call.
Possible values for the data argument are:
PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_ENABLE
Enable SIGTRAP signal delivery on capability
mode access violations. The enabled mode is
inherited by the children of the process,
and is kept after fexecve(2) calls.
PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_DISABLE
Disable SIGTRAP signal delivery on
capability mode access violations. Note
that the global sysctl kern.trap_enotcap
might still cause the signal to be
delivered. See capsicum(4).
On signal delivery, the si_errno member of the
siginfo signal handler parameter is set to the
system call error value, and the si_code member is
set to TRAP_CAP. The system call number is stored
in the si_syscall field of the siginfo signal
handler parameter. The other system call parameters
can be read from the ucontext_t but the system call
number is typically stored in the register that also
contains the return value and so is unavailable in
the signal handler.
See capsicum(4) for more information about
capability mode.
PROC_TRAPCAP_STATUS Return the current status of raising SIGTRAP for
capability mode access violations by the specified
process. The integer value pointed to by the data
argument is set to the PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_ENABLE value
if SIGTRAP delivery is enabled, and to
PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL_DISABLE otherwise.
See the note about sysctl kern.trap_enotcap above,
which gives independent global control of signal
delivery.
PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL Request the delivery of a signal when the parent of
the calling process exits. idtype must be P_PID and
id must be the either caller's pid or zero, with no
difference in effect. The value is cleared for
child processes and when executing set-user-ID or
set-group-ID binaries. data must point to a value
of type int indicating the signal that should be
delivered to the caller. Use zero to cancel a
previously requested signal delivery.
PROC_PDEATHSIG_STATUS
Query the current signal number that will be
delivered when the parent of the calling process
exits. idtype must be P_PID and id must be the
either caller's pid or zero, with no difference in
effect. data must point to a memory location that
can hold a value of type int. If signal delivery
has not been requested, it will contain zero on
return.
PROC_STACKGAP_CTL Controls stack gaps in the specified process. A
stack gap is one or more virtual memory pages at the
end of the growth area for a MAP_STACK mapping that
is reserved and never backed by memory. Instead,
the process is guaranteed to receive a synchronous
SIGSEGV signal for each access to pages in the gap.
The number of pages reserved for each stack is set
by the sysctl security.bsd.stack_guard_page.
Gaps protect against stack overflows by preventing
them from corrupting memory adjacent to the stack.
The data argument must point to an integer variable
containing flags. The following flags are allowed:
PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE
This flag is only accepted for consistency
with PROC_STACKGAP_STATUS. If stack gaps
are enabled, the flag is ignored. If stack
gaps are disabled, the request fails with
EINVAL. After gaps are disabled in a
process, they can only be re-enabled when an
execve(2) is performed.
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE
Disable stack gaps for the process. For
existing stacks, the gap is no longer
reserved and can be filled by memory on
access.
PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE_EXEC
Enable stack gaps for the new address space
constructed by any future execve(2) in the
specified process.
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC
Inherit disabled stack gaps state after
execve(2). In other words, if the currently
executing program has stack gaps disabled,
they are kept disabled on exec. If gaps
were enabled, they are kept enabled after
exec.
The stack gap state is inherited from the parent on
fork(2).
PROC_STACKGAP_STATUS
Returns the current stack gap state for the
specified process. data must point to an integer
variable, which is used to return a bitmask
consisting of the following flags:
PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE
Stack gaps are enabled.
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE
Stack gaps are disabled.
PROC_STACKGAP_ENABLE_EXEC
Stack gaps are enabled in the process after
execve(2).
PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE_EXEC
Stack gaps are disabled in the process after
execve(2).
Note that the elfctl(1) "nostackgap" flag takes
precedence over this setting for individual process
address spaces. Executing a binary with this flag
set will never use stack gaps in the address space
constructed by execve(2). However, the controls
value can still be inherited by child processes, and
executing a binary without this flag set will revert
to the behavior specified by the control.
PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_CTL
Allows one to ignore the set-user-ID and set-group-
ID bits on the program images activated by execve(2)
in the specified process and its future descendants.
The data parameter must point to an integer variable
holding the following value:
PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_ENABLE
Request set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits to
be ignored.
It is not possible to disable this control once it
has been enabled.
PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_STATUS
Returns the current status of set-ID bits enablement
for the target process. The data parameter must
point to an integer variable, where one of the
following values is written:
PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_ENABLE
PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_DISABLE
PROC_WXMAP_CTL Controls the creation of mappings with both write
and execute permissions in a process's address
space. The data parameter must point to an integer
variable holding one of the following values:
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_PERMIT
Enable creation of mappings that have both
write and execute permissions in the
specified process' current and future
address spaces.
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_DISALLOW_EXEC
In a new address space created by a future
call to execve(2), disallow creation of
mappings that have both write and execute
permissions.
If both flags are set,
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_DISALLOW_EXEC takes precedence
during execve(2). If neither flag is set, mappings
with write and execute permissions are only
permitted if the kern.elf{32/64}.allow_wx sysctl is
non-zero or the elfctl(1) "wxneeded" flag is set in
the ELF control note.
Once creation of writeable and executable mappings
is enabled for a process, it is impossible (and
pointless) to disable it. The only way to ensure
the absence of such mappings after they were enabled
in a given process is to set the
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_DISALLOW_EXEC flag and execve(2) an
image.
PROC_WXMAP_STATUS Returns the current status of the controls over
creation of mappings with both write and execute
permissions for the specified process. The data
parameter must point to an integer variable, where
one of the following values is written:
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_PERMIT
Creation of simultaneously writable and
executable mappings are permitted;
otherwise, the process cannot create such
mappings.
PROC_WX_MAPPINGS_DISALLOW_EXEC
After execve(2), the new address space will
not permit creation of simultaneously
writable and executable mappings.
Additionally, if the address space of the process
does not permit creation of simultaneously writable
and executable mappings and it is guaranteed that no
such mapping was created since address space
creation, the PROC_WXORX_ENFORCE flag is set in the
returned value.
x86 MACHINE-SPECIFIC REQUESTS
PROC_KPTI_CTL AMD64 only. Controls the Kernel Page Table Isolation
(KPTI) option for the children of the specified
process. This control is only meaningful if KPTI has
been enabled globally by the vm.pmap.kpti tunable. It
is not possible to change the KPTI setting for a
running process, only for new address spaces
constructed by a future execve(2).
The data parameter must point to an integer variable
containing one of the following commands:
PROC_KPTI_CTL_ENABLE_ON_EXEC
Enable KPTI after execve(2).
PROC_KPTI_CTL_DISABLE_ON_EXEC
Disable KPTI after execve(2). Only root or a
process having the PRIV_IO privilege can use
this option.
PROC_KPTI_STATUS Returns the current KPTI status for the specified
process. data must point to an integer variable, where
one of the following values is written:
PROC_KPTI_CTL_ENABLE_ON_EXEC
PROC_KPTI_CTL_DISABLE_ON_EXEC
The status is or-ed with PROC_KPTI_STATUS_ACTIVE if
KPTI is active for the current address space of the
process.
NOTES
Disabling tracing on a process should not be considered a security
feature, as it is bypassable both by the kernel and privileged processes
and via other system mechanisms. As such, it should not be utilized to
reliably protect cryptographic keying material or other confidential
data.
Note that processes can trivially bypass the 'no simultaneously writable
and executable mappings' policy by first marking some mapping as
writeable, writing code to it, then removing write and adding execute
permission. This may be legitimately required by some programs such as
JIT compilers.
RETURN VALUES
If an error occurs, a value of -1 is returned and errno is set to
indicate the error.
ERRORS
The procctl() system call will fail if:
[EFAULT] The data parameter points outside the process's
allocated address space.
[EINVAL] The cmd argument specifies an unsupported command.
The idtype argument specifies an unsupported
identifier type.
[EPERM] The calling process does not have permission to
perform the requested operation on any of the selected
processes.
[ESRCH] No processes matched the requested idtype and id.
[EINVAL] An invalid operation or flag was passed in data for a
PROC_SPROTECT command.
[EPERM] The idtype argument is not equal to P_PID, or id is
not equal to the pid of the calling process, for
PROC_REAP_ACQUIRE or PROC_REAP_RELEASE requests.
[EINVAL] Invalid or undefined flags were passed to a
PROC_REAP_KILL request.
[EINVAL] An invalid or zero signal number was requested for a
PROC_REAP_KILL request.
[EINVAL] A PROC_REAP_RELEASE request was issued by the init(8)
process.
[EBUSY] A PROC_REAP_ACQUIRE request was issued by a process
that is already a reaper process.
[EBUSY] A PROC_TRACE_CTL request was issued for a process
being traced.
[EPERM] A PROC_TRACE_CTL request to re-enable tracing of the
process (PROC_TRACE_CTL_ENABLE), or to disable
persistence of PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE on execve(2)
specified a target process other than the calling
process.
[EINVAL] The value of the integer data parameter for the
PROC_TRACE_CTL or PROC_TRAPCAP_CTL request is invalid.
[EINVAL] The PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL or PROC_PDEATHSIG_STATUS
request referenced an unsupported id, idtype or
invalid signal number.
SEE ALSO
dtrace(1), elfctl(1), proccontrol(1), protect(1), cap_enter(2), kill(2),
ktrace(2), mmap(2), mprotect(2), ptrace(2), wait(2), capsicum(4),
hwpmc(4), init(8)
HISTORY
The procctl() function appeared in FreeBSD 10.0.
The reaper facility is based on a similar feature in Linux and
DragonflyBSD, and first appeared in FreeBSD 10.2.
The PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL facility is based on the `prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG,
...)' feature in Linux, and first appeared in FreeBSD 11.2.
ASLR support was added for checklist compliance in FreeBSD 13.0.
FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8 December 4, 2024 FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8