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0 Command: mac_ifoff | Section: 4 | Source: FreeBSD | File: mac_ifoff.4.gz
MAC_IFOFF(4) FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual MAC_IFOFF(4) NAME mac_ifoff - interface silencing policy SYNOPSIS To compile the interface silencing policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file: options MAC options MAC_IFOFF Alternately, to load the interface silencing policy module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file: options MAC and in loader.conf(5): mac_ifoff_load="YES" DESCRIPTION The mac_ifoff interface silencing module allows administrators to enable and disable incoming and outgoing data flow on system network interfaces via the sysctl(8) interface. To disable network traffic over the loopback (lo(4)) interface, set the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled to 0 (default 1). To enable network traffic over other interfaces, set the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled to 1 (default 0). To allow BPF traffic to be received, even while other traffic is disabled, set the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled to 1 (default 0). Label Format No labels are defined. SEE ALSO mac(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), mac(9) HISTORY The mac_ifoff policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. AUTHORS This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. BUGS While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8 July 25, 2015 FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8

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