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CPRNG(9) FreeBSD Kernel Developer's Manual CPRNG(9) NAME cprng, cprng_strong_create, cprng_strong_destroy, cprng_strong, cprng_strong32, cprng_strong64, cprng_fast, cprng_fast32, cprng_fast64 - cryptographic pseudorandom number generators SYNOPSIS #include <sys/cprng.h> cprng_strong_t * cprng_strong_create(const char *name, int ipl, int flags); void cprng_strong_destroy(cprng_strong_t *cprng); size_t cprng_strong(cprng_strong_t *cprng, void *buf, size_t len, int flags); uint32_t cprng_strong32(void); uint64_t cprng_strong64(void); size_t cprng_fast(void *buf, size_t len); uint32_t cprng_fast32(void); uint64_t cprng_fast64(void); #define CPRNG_MAX_LEN 524288 DESCRIPTION The cprng family of functions provide cryptographic pseudorandom number generators automatically seeded from the kernel entropy pool. All applications in the kernel requiring random data or random choices should use the cprng_strong family of functions, unless performance constraints demand otherwise. The cprng_fast family of functions may be used in applications that can tolerate exposure of past random data, such as initialization vectors or transaction ids that are sent over the internet anyway, if the applications require higher throughput or lower per-request latency than the cprng_strong family of functions provide. If in doubt, choose cprng_strong. A single instance of the fast generator serves the entire kernel. A well-known instance of the strong generator, kern_cprng, may be used by any in-kernel caller, but separately seeded instances of the strong generator can also be created by calling cprng_strong_create(). The cprng functions may be used in soft interrupt context, except for cprng_strong_create() and cprng_strong_destroy() which are allowed only at IPL_NONE in thread context; see spl(9). The cprng functions replace the legacy arc4random(9) and rnd_extract_data(9) functions. FUNCTIONS cprng_strong_create(name, ipl, flags) Create an instance of the cprng_strong generator. This generator currently implements the NIST SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG with SHA-256 as the hash function. The name argument is used to "personalize" the Hash_DRBG according to the standard, so that its initial state will depend both on seed material from the entropy pool and also on the personalization string (name). The ipl argument specifies the interrupt priority level for the mutex which will serialize access to the new instance of the generator (see spl(9)), and must be no higher than IPL_SOFTSERIAL. The flags argument must be zero. Creation will succeed even if full entropy for the generator is not available. In this case, the first request to read from the generator may cause reseeding. cprng_strong_create() may sleep to allocate memory. cprng_strong_destroy(cprng) Destroy cprng. cprng_strong_destroy() may sleep. cprng_strong(cprng, buf, len, flags) Fill memory location buf with up to len bytes from the generator cprng, and return the number of bytes. len must be at most CPRNG_MAX_LEN. flags must be zero. cprng_strong32() Generate 32 bits using the kern_cprng strong generator. cprng_strong32() does not sleep. cprng_strong64() Generate 64 bits using the kern_cprng strong generator. cprng_strong64() does not sleep. cprng_fast(buf, len) Fill memory location buf with len bytes from the fast generator. cprng_fast() does not sleep. cprng_fast32() Generate 32 bits using the fast generator. cprng_fast32() does not sleep. cprng_fast64() Generate 64 bits using the fast generator. cprng_fast64() does not sleep. SECURITY MODEL The cprng family of functions provide the following security properties: o An attacker who has seen some outputs of any of the cprng functions cannot predict past or future unseen outputs. o An attacker who has compromised kernel memory cannot predict past outputs of the cprng_strong functions. However, such an attacker may be able to predict past outputs of the cprng_fast functions. The second property is sometimes called "backtracking resistance", "forward secrecy", or "key erasure" in the cryptography literature. The cprng_strong functions provide backtracking resistance; the cprng_fast functions do not. CODE REFERENCES The cprng_strong functions are implemented in sys/kern/subr_cprng.c, and use the NIST SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG implementation in sys/crypto/nist_hash_drbg. The cprng_fast functions are implemented in sys/crypto/cprng_fast/cprng_fast.c, and use the ChaCha8 stream cipher. SEE ALSO condvar(9), rnd(9), spl(9) Elaine Barker and John Kelsey, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised), National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011, NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Rev 1. Daniel J. Bernstein, ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20, http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#chacha, 2008-01-28, Document ID: 4027b5256e17b9796842e6d0f68b0b5e. HISTORY The cprng family of functions first appeared in NetBSD 6.0. FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8 August 16, 2020 FreeBSD 14.1-RELEASE-p8